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Methodological Transplants: 
Linguistics, Science, the Arts and Literary Criticism 
GIOVANNI CARSANIGA* 
By outlining a few interdisciplinary issues in the context of recent 
developments of critical theory, I intend to pay tribute to my 
distinguished predecessors, Frederick May and Gino Rizzo, both 
of whom, in different ways, were passionately committed to 
interdisciplinarity. I would really need a series of lectures to 
realise my intentions, and even a cursory summary of what I 
intend to do would take too long. 
Let me therefore move straightaway into my argument and take 
as my starting point a piece of literature. By doing so I am already 
begging a number of questions: that it is possible to distinguish 
literature from non-literature, that literature comes in recognisable 
chunks or pieces, and that there is someone, a writer, who gave it 
a visible form which I shall call text. These propositions, further-
more, presuppose that there is someone who does the distinguishing 
or the recognising, and that this someone can be identified with one 
or more real persons. All this may be intuitive but is still problematic. 
I spoke of the text as 'visible' form, but until recently the vast 
majority of recognisably literary texts have been consumed in 
audible form. Many still are to-day. I use the word 'consumed' to 
avoid prejudging the issue of what exactly one does with the text, 
or to it, which I hope may become clearer as I go on. Often the 
visual component of the audible text is more likely to be a 
performance than its appearance on a written or printed page. 
Without being consciously aware of the fact, most times we think 
of a literary text as if we were thinking of its original form we 
are actually thinking about our experience of its production, 
reproduction and consumption. We experience the poem or novel 
as a book object, or a part of a book object, totally unlike what it 
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was when it was ftrst written, even granting that it had or could 
have an original form as opposed to various co-existing drafts. 
We read the play in the quiet of our sitting room, or see it on 
television, or enjoy it in the distinctive environment of a theatre, 
through the mediation of a host of intermediaries: actors, 
designers, stage hands, scenery painters and builders, set decorators, 
property people, lighting engineers, a director and a dramaturge, 
not forgetting the rest of the audience; so that the same play, seen 
on two different nights, or in two different productions, amounts to 
utterly different experiences, throwing doubt on what exactly is 
meant by 'the same play'. 
I also propose to assume that our piece of literature is a work of 
art in the sense of being the product of an aesthetically satisfying 
activity: aiming, that is, to give pleasure to its practitioners, both 
producers and consumers. Literature does that, in common with 
painting or music, but things are widely different in most other 
respects. One does not enjoy a piece of literature as one does a 
concert or a painting. To begin with, most people, whether they are 
literate or not, can feel some pleasure merely by seeing a painting 
or a sculpture (in most cases via a reproduction), by looking at a 
dance, by listening to a poem or a play. But only literate people can 
read a text. Listening to the sounds of a musical performance, 
preferably live, is a pleasure open to all. These differences in modes 
of consumption are due to the different peculiarities of the artistic 
'object'. Music is usually encoded in a score, but the original score 
handwritten by the composer is not for consumption, not even by 
the highly trained few who could re-create its sound in their mind 
(and even for them reading a score is not as rich an experience as 
listening to its performance). Various performances of that score 
may have been encoded by other means on vinyl, tape or CD 
records; but we can only access that encoding through playing 
machines with varying degrees of fidelity. No playback or 
performance is the piece of music. There is no original, in the same 
sense as there is one for a painting or a sculpture. And yet we 
experience most visual arts through reproductions which 
approximate it in varying degrees of accuracy. In the case of 
paintings they may be analogues of the original: not in the case of 
sculptures mostly reproduced as two-dimensional illustrations. 
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The original manuscript of a work of literature, when it exists, is 
largely irrelevant to our appreciation of its text. If we are literate, 
we obtain access to the text through a multitude of analogues 
which, however much unlike the original or one another, are all 
equally valid representations (to concern ourselves with translations 
would require a separate lecture). 
Literature differs from the visual arts and music also because 
its medium is language, which, unlike sounds, shapes or colours, 
happens to be the chief means of communication between human 
beings. Sounds, shapes and colours can also be used as signs within 
a communication code. Codes, however, are sign systems either 
referring to a pre-constituted and conventionally invariable set of 
meanings, like traffic signs or electrical wiring; or encoding 
language, like the Morse code, or the codes used by spies. Sounds, 
shapes and colours are meaningfully and even systematically used 
by artists to express a variety of emotions; and to that extent one 
loosely uses phrases such as 'the language of music' and 'the 
meaning of colours'. But they lack the two fundamental properties 
of language: the ability to express new contents, and to refer to 
itself. 
The question of self-reference needs clarification. We need to 
distinguish between formal and narrative self-reference, which all 
arts have, and discursive self-reference which is a property of 
language. Self-reference is formal, when certain parts of the work, 
or of other people's compositions, are copied, quoted, elaborated; it 
is narrative when the work refers to its art form in its contents. The 
music of Bach, for instance, exhibits in his fugues the most absorbing 
and intellectually satisfying self-reference of the formal type. Saint-
Saens Le carnival des animaux or Elgar's Enigma Variations show 
narrative self-reference, alluding to other musicians in a more or 
less transparent way. The graphic work of the great Maurits Comelis 
Escher is wholly based on self-reference of both types. And we are 
all familiar with what the French call mise en abime: the play 
within the play in Shakespeare and Pirandello, the film about film-
making such as Truffaut's La nuit americaine or Diane Kourys' s 
A Man in Love, the ballet about ballet like Antony Tudor's 
Gala Perfonnance. Literature offers any number of poems about 
poetry, from Horace's Epistula ad Pisones through Boileau's 
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Art Pottique to Manzoni's Sermone a Giovan Battista Pagani; or 
of novels about the writing of novels: to mention only a recent 
Italian example, Calvino's Se una notte d'invemo un viaggiatore 
(lfon a Winter's Night A Traveller, 1981). 
It is easier to maintain that all arts are self-referential by pointing 
out that reference to external reality is irrelevant to them. That does 
not mean that the arts may not refer to external reality. only that 
their meaning, and our enjoyment of it, is not dictated by reference, 
narrative contents or mimesis (imitation or reproduction of reality). 
Music, for instance, is incapable of explicit narrative content. 
One may guess that the fourth movement of Beethoven's 6th 
Symphony alludes to a storm, but it is possible to identify the 
previous movement as a 'scene by a brook' only by reading it in the 
programme. No one could identify the four Kalevala legends Sibelius 
was inspired by in his tone poems simply by listening to the music. 
When dance tells a story, as in Swan wke or The Nutcracker, it 
does so through movements that bear little resemblance to normal 
body movements, and require a conventional interpretation. Most 
modern dance is abstract. As for representational painting, no one 
would be so naive today as to judge of its merit by the accuracy 
with which it portrays reality. Reference to external reality is equally 
irrelevant in the case of literature, in spite of the fact that a great 
deal of the discussion about it is still concerned with what it allegedly 
refers to, or communicates. 
Reference and communication are not identical concepts. 
Literature may communicate emotions or ideas, but it does not 
follow that it necessarily refers to anything outside the emotions or 
ideas it contains. Schoolteachers, alas! still train students to evaluate 
literature as if the point of doing it were to compare the imaginary 
characters in texts to real persons. Historical novels, like Manzoni's 
I promessi sposi. or Tolstoy's War and Peace, mention real persons, 
such as Cardinal Federigo Borromeo, or Napoleon; but their 
appearance is functional to the fictional plot of the novel, not to real 
history. Whereas history writing or everyday communication are 
mostly about things outside the act of communication itself, 
literature, like music, painting, or any other art, is mostly self-
contained and almost inevitably ends up by drawing attention to its 
internal structure; not only to what it says but also, perhaps primarily, 
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to how it does it. Art tells us something about reality mostly insofar 
as the work of art itself becomes part of our cultural horizon. 
Language, however, is self-referential in a more complex way, 
which I called discursive self-reference. We can only talk about 
language (including the language of literature) by using language, 
and we distinguish the two levels by calling 'metalanguage' the 
language we use to talk about language. We can use mathematical 
symbols to elaborate and express mathematical theory, and to that 
extent the language of mathematics can be self-referential: but it is 
limited to logico-mathematical propositions and cannot encode any 
contents outside its own system. We cannot discuss piano playing 
by playing the piano, or the Heidelberg School's work by painting 
a picture. It seems therefore reasonable to suppose that an improved 
understanding of what language is about might result also in a 
better understanding of literature. 
Granted that the point of literary language is not reference, it 
still is a form of communication, often powerful enough to cross 
time and space. We therefore have to establish in what way the 
language ofliterature differs from that of everyday communication, 
technical manuals, legal contracts and commercial correspondence. 
We cannot merely say that the difference lies in the fact that 
literature's use of language is aesthetically satisfying, because that 
was part of our initial assumption, and one cannot use as evidence 
what was part of one's assumptions. In the past critics tried to 
Sidestep the difficulty by saying that there are certain forms of 
language having in themselves an aesthetically satisfying qUality. 
They thus developed a theory of specifically 'artistic' forms called 
rhetorical figures, such as metaphors, similes and other tropes. 
They prescribed the use of restricted lexical choices. Words and 
expressions used in everyday communication were deemed to be 
inelegant and banned from poetry. A wide range of contents was 
also banned. This type of criticism was developed from the classical 
age down to the present time, often with great ingenuity and 
marvellous subtlety; and it yielded many valuable insights into the 
nature of the literary phenomenon. It did not explain, however, why 
many texts written according to the rules, full of all sorts of rhetorical 
figures and dignified lexical choices, about uplifting subjects, crafted 
with great Sincerity and moral commitment, were obviously 
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worthless; whereas many others, apparently unadorned, undignified 
or 'irregular', were clearly of great artistic merit. 
lbis kind of criticism, prescribing the lexical ingredients of 
lyric poetry or the structure of regular tragedies, went hand in hand 
with prescriptive grammar, and both were based on an extensive 
study of classical languages and literatures. In the seventeenth 
century the rationalistic grammar of Port Royal, with its underlying 
belief in the psychological foundations of linguistic categories and 
in the close connection between the structure of language and that 
of logical thought, harmonised well with the rationalistic criticism 
of Boileau, stressing the interdependence of clear thought and clear 
style, and the role of reason in poetry as an antidote to the blazing 
follies of the Baroque age, 'de tous ces faux brillants l'eclatante 
folie'. The end of the eighteenth century saw the beginning of 
historical and comparative linguistics, which deeply influenced 
literary studies making them heavily dependent upon textual 
criticism, the study of tradition and the discovery of literary sources 
and analogues. The awareness that linguists such as Wilhelm von 
Humboldt derived from their study of linguistic change and 
development of the energy and creativity of language, reflecting 
the energy and spirit of human societies, was consonant with much 
of the best criticism of the Romantic age, with its emphasis on 
creativity and emotional power. 
The rift between literature and language studies began when, in 
the first decades of this century, linguistics went through a sort of 
revolution which may be conveniently symbolised by the name of 
Ferdinand de Saussure. Saussure saw that the investigation of a 
historical phenomenon through time and space clearly does not 
amount to a description of what constitutes the phenomenon itself. 
One may be able to gain some understanding of the purposes and 
use of a car (to give an updated example) by looking at the history 
of transport and comparing one vehicle with another, but that would 
not be the same as the knowledge of how a car is engineered and 
what makes it work. Of course pre-Saussurean linguists had a 
pretty good grasp oflanguage structures; but the point is that such a 
grasp could not have been wholly and safely founded on the 
comparative study of aspects ofianguage, taken at various stages in 
various language histories, since the choice of those aspects and 
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the identification of those stages presupposed linguistic structures, 
and an intuitive non-explicit procedure for recognising or 
constructing them. Saussure's plea for a synchronic or structural 
study of language systems was a plea that discovery procedures be 
made explicit. In his perspective, synchronic and diachronic (or 
historical) methodologies were complementary: the results obtained 
through one can be embodied in hypotheses to be confirmed through 
the other. In practice Structuralism, as the synchronic methodology 
came to be known because of its reliance on the concepts of 
structure and system, came to replace or displace traditional 
philology, causing the resentment of many of its adepts. They 
reacted by denying that structuralism could be a proper scientific 
method for studying language or languages. That in turn caused 
some reflection on the question whether, and under what conditions, 
linguistics could claim to be a science, and its methods transplanted 
to other fields of research. 
It is easy to see how the Saussurean revolution caused a breach 
between the study of language and literary studies which, in many 
academic departments, were inextricably tied to the study of the old 
classical languages in which many great masterpieces had been 
written and hence to traditional philology. Criticism at its most 
'scientific' had been closely concerned with tradition, periodisation, 
source-influence; and critics therefore were antagonistic to the notion 
that the diachronic dimension could somehow be dispensed with. 
At its most subjective, their work dealt with elusive impressions, 
personal evaluations, intuitions, perceptions, such as only 
discerning practitioners of literature could hope to have. They 
therefore rejected the idea that criticism could be made 'scientific' 
through a 'science oflanguage', and open to any upstart capable of 
applying a few objective 'discovery procedures' to a text. 
The Saussurean revolution had however brought to fruition a 
tendency which had already begun in the eighteenth century: a shift 
from an atomistic view of language as a lexicon of reality to a 
contextual and epistemological view, focussing on the way in which 
language represents mental processes. Freed from its obsession 
with individual sounds and lexical items, which had reached its 
climax in the second half of the nineteenth century, linguistics 
could now profitably explore large systems of structures. Historical 
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and comparative philologists used to construct suitably large fields 
of study by extending the diachrony through which they investigated 
and reconstructed small particles of language. The new linguists 
widened their context by choosing larger synchronic samples or 
'corpuses' of language which they studied in toto. Structuralist 
methodology could therefore be seen as better suited to the 
systematic study of literary texts than one having as its object the 
study of isolated forms. But what could a literary 'corpus' consist 
in? a single poem? the collection of which that poem was a part? 
the whole poetic output of its author? the whole literary tradition to 
which the writer belonged, and by contrast those to which s/he did 
not belong? Should literary critics study texts as individual instances 
of poetic parole, or take them as manifestations of the great system 
of poetic langue which is the real object of investigation? In order 
to gain a clearer insight into these methodological transplants, let 
us go back to the 'piece of literature' we took as our starting point. 
Let us imagine that our literary object is a love sonnet, two 
words roughly referring to its contents, or subject matter, and form. 
I have said 'contents and form' as if they were two ontologically 
separate and discrete things, but things are not so simple. In the 
poem itself neither member of the pair can subsist without the 
other. And yet a closer investigation makes it possible to distinguish 
between not two but four separate concepts: 
(1) the form of the form, in this case its being a sonnet with a 
specific form common to countless other sonnets; 
(2) the form of the contents, being the conventions the poem 
shares with similar ways of expressing one's love in poetry 
(for instance, the assumption that it is unrequited); 
(3) the substance of the form, that is, the structure of the text; 
and 
(4) the substance of the contents: what the poem actually says. 
This distinction, borrowed from Saussure and the Danish linguist 
Louis Hjelmslev, can be fruitfully applied to literary criticism 
because it provides a justification of a structuralist, as distinct from 
a historical, study both of the various conventions shaping types of 
literary contents, such as the love lyric with its complaint about 
unrequited love, the epic romance with its typical duels between 
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knights, the fairy tale with its happy ending, the detective story 
with its turns and twists and suspense; and also of such form and 
contents classes as sonnets, canzoni, anecdotes, jokes, not to speak 
of more traditional genres like tragedy, comedy, the novel. 
One could multiply distinctions of this kind; between the various 
voices that may be speaking in the text, say the poet as himself or 
herself; the poet as some other kind of poet, a bard, a visionary, a 
prophet; a dramatic character speaking in verse; a narrator. In a 
narrati ve text we may have the narrator speaking in the first person 
as the writer, or as the writer introducing the narrator who tells the 
story, or as the protagonist of the story. There may be different 
viewpoints or focuses: the omniscient narrator with unlimited access 
to the characters' thoughts and emotions; the knowledgeable but 
not omniscient narrator who may be on the fringes of the story as 
an observer or inside it as a minor character; the limited outlook 
narrator, who may be telling the story in the third person from the 
viewpoint of one of the characters, or the protagonist speaking in 
the first person. The focalisation may shift from one to the other of 
these types. And then we have to consider whom all these voices 
speak to, within the text and outside it: whether the intended recipient 
of the text is someone imagined to be within the story (for instance, 
the woman to whom the poet declares his love in the sonnet); or 
who could be within it as an ideal contemporary of the characters; 
or totally outside the story, as another writer, a critic, a cultivated 
reader, an uncultivated reader, a contemporary of the author or 
someone from a distant future. Here too various combinations 
are possible. 
Our love sonnet stands now identified as a rather complex 
chunk. As to its form, it is perceived as a poem-thing intrinsically 
different and relating to different interpretive conventions from a 
drama-thing or a novel-thing. Within its formal class it is perceived 
as a sonnet long before it is decoded: one needs only to look at the 
number of lines and the pattern of rhymes. Its pre-verbal significance 
is totally independent of its linguistic message even if it concurs 
with it in the realisation of its global meaning. The form of the 
contents also transcends language, though we obviously rely on our 
decoding in order to decide what it is: to be a member of the class 
of love poems transcends the message of this particular sonnet. 
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Like a feminine plural noun in Italian or French, belonging to two 
separate morphological classes which cannot be easily seen or 
separated in the actual word, our text belongs to two formal classes, 
poem and sonnet, the latter implying the former; but neither 
membership is actually visible in a separate label. Like Saussure's 
langue, they are objective but intangible realities, existing outside 
any individual manifestation of their members. 
When we move to substance, it may appear at first sight that its 
form and subject matter are somehow embodied in the poem-thing, 
but how can that be? Unlike a painting-thing or a sculpture-thing of 
which there must be an original, displaying those features that 
enable one to assign it to a specific class of objects, the poem-thing 
has no Original and cannot consequently have reproductions, only 
presentations. Whereas the original of a visual work of art displays 
qualities that may be completely missing from a reproduction, a 
poem's substance does not change for being written in longhand or 
printed or spoken aloud, though the manner of its presentation can 
also be significant. Its text is a real, factual object, and yet it is 
impossible to say where or how it actually exists. 
It is now becoming increasingly obvious that the meaning of a 
literary text cannot be reduced to any of the factors we have singled 
out so far, but must depend upon their complex interaction. 1 cannot 
possibly explain the whole of semantics in a sentence: but let me 
just say that meaning does not arise on a specified level at the end 
of the decoding process, but occurs at every level on which an 
element in a structure is related to its component parts and to the 
system of which it is a component in all the various ways we have 
looked at so far. The fact that something can be recognised as 
having a structure or being part of one is evidence of its having 
a meaning of some sort. The total ascertainable meaning (I am 
going to suggest in due course that the whole meaning is not 
ascertainable), results from all these partial meanings and at the 
same time is much more than their mere sum. Structuralists have 
shown how the elements can be identified. Each element in a 
structure can be seen as 
(a) an arrangement of smaller parts; 
(b) a part in a larger arrangement; 
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(c) a member of the classes of all similarly arranged elements; 
(d) a member of the classes of all elements that may become a 
part of the same larger arrangement. 
Let me clarify this by means of a simple linguistic example. 
Take the sentence He comes invariably late. Let us look at invariably. 
It can be analysed as a linear arrangement (in its written form), or a 
complex sound sequence (in its spoken form) of a negative prefix in-
followed by an adjectival stem -vari- and the suffix -able modified 
by the adverclal ending -ly. Note that identifiable elements are 
not always neatly separable: -ly is not separable from -able in the 
previous example as it is from real in really. Invariably is itself a 
part of the larger arrangement He comes invariably late. It is a 
member of various classes of similarly constituted words, like 
indelibly, internally, intangibly, which may be extended to include 
other negative adverbs like untruthfully, unmistakably, but not 
other adverbs such as rather, always, too. It is a member of the 
class of all adverbs that can take its place in the sentence without 
infringing any rule of acceptability, including rather, always, too, 
but not indelibly, internally or intangibly. Similarly any part of 
invariably may be shown to be an arrangement of minimal 
significant units of sound called phonemes, which can themselves 
be subject to further analysis through a sound spectroscope; and the 
whole sentence may be related to an endless continuum of higher 
contexts. Each element has a meaning at the level on which it 
combines in the structure: in- is negative in invariably but not in 
internally; invariably means in this context 'always' and not 
'changelessly'. The meaning of the whole sentence depends on its 
context: but more about that in a moment. 
Coming back to our love sonnet, it is a sequential arrangement 
of words. It is also a part of a number of larger arrangements. It 
belongs to the work of the poet in its entirety, to a particular series 
of love sonnets by the same author, to the class of poems written 
during a particular period, to a body of national literature. It is a 
member of the class of poems called sonnets by virtue of their 
internal formal structure, or love poems by reason of their contents. 
One may look at it also as a member of the class of all texts which 
would fit any system of which it can be a part (other drafts or 
13 
versions of the same sonnet, alternative poems that might be 
included in its place in an anthology etc.). All these classes contain 
texts which have what is nowadays called an 'intertextual' 
relationship with the poem under examination, and impinge on it in 
someway. 
Literature, like language, is sequential because it is time-bound 
and to a certain extent it unfolds sequentially, although, like music, 
it is also a complex harmony of many concurrent features. That 
also applies to written language, with all its resonances and 
implications. But sequentiality is a mode of production and analysis, 
and cannot possibly account for comprehension The highest speed 
of which the human brain is capable in identifying separate elements 
of a sequence is from 7 to 9 signs per second. But this speed is too 
low for comprehension, because the elements, once identified, cannot 
be retained at that speed: by the time one has reached the end of the 
sequence one has forgotten the beginning. If I uttered the previous 
sentence by spelling its words one by one you would not understand 
it. What we comprehend are Gestalten: not strings of elements but 
complex multila)'ered chunks. We make sense of them in a non-
sequential way: the meaning of something in the early portion of 
a sentence may become clear only after reaching its end (a well-
known feature of German syntax). It may even depend upon its 
not being clear until the end. 
This point was convincingly made for literature by Roland 
Barthes in SIZ, where he analyzes a story by Balzac entitled 
Sarrasine. At a certain point in the story Sarrasine, a young sculptor, 
embraces Zambrinella, an operatic soprano, while travelling in a 
carriage towards Frascati. At that point neither he, nor the reader, 
know that Zambrinella is not a woman but a castrato: that will 
become apparent only later in the story. The full implications of 
the episode can therefore be realised either when one is not actually 
reading it but reading a subsequent page, or on a second reading. 
The appreCiation of the story depends on a non-sequential 
comprehension in which earlier features are recollected on a first 
reading, and later features are remembered when going through 
the earlier stages for a second time; and one's former role as first 
reader is compared with the present, producing a sort of dramatic 
irony. Non-sequential comprehension is characteristic of tragedy 
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which depends for our enjoyment of it on our previous 
knowledge of the plot. All Greek tragedies were based upon well-
known myths or stories. Even today there is hardly any spectator 
of Hamlet who is in any doubt as to the Prince's fate. Even if one 
has never heard the story one expects the protagonist to fall from 
high, fail, and die, because that is the convention of tragedy. The 
opposite convention prevails in thrillers: we may grip the edges of 
our seat in watching the unspeakable dangers James Bond goes 
through, but we know from the very beginning that nothing can 
ever kill him, even when we see him placed in a coffin in the first 
scene of the film. 
The fact that our sequential structures of analysis are 
incompatible with our non-sequential mode of comprehension is a 
serious weakness of the structuralist approach to literature. It is 
similar to the weakness of phrase-structure grammar which, as 
Chomsky pointed out, cannot account for relatively simple 
phenomena such as the difference in meaning of identically 
structured sentences, the syntactic relationship between 
discontinuous forms, or the fact that obviously related sentences 
like an active clause and its corresponding passive cannot be 
produced one from the other by means of step-by-step re-write 
rules. It would seem that both the grammatical and the literary 
study of a text cannot stop at its sequential surface, but must posit 
other levels of textuality inaccessible to the usual structural 
analysis based on composition, distribution, interrelation and contrast 
of surface features. When one considers intertextuality it is clear 
that the subtle relationships between a text and its intertexts cannot 
possibly be grasped without hopping, so to speak, to and fro from 
one to the others. And the ability to perform these hops is not equal 
for all readers since it depends on the varying levels of literary 
competence of each one of them and the number of intertexts they 
can recognise. 
All this points to the inescapable conclusion that many of the 
alleged properties of the literary object do not belong with the 
object at all, but depend on it being made sense of in a certain way, 
according to often implicit conventions. When I said earlier on: He 
comes invariably late you no doubt supplied an unspoken context, 
probably about a friend who is never on time. If I nowsay 
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At the long table of life, 
before an empty plate, 
Fate sits, the uninvited guest: 
he comes invariably late. 
you would probably try to discover more meaning in the sentence 
than you would bother to look for in the context you supplied, 
because you would take those four lines as a poem (don't try too 
hard: the poem is mine). And you would take them as a poem 
because of their rhythm and rhyme, that is the way in which the 
four lines fit a context of literary conventions, and would probably 
try to recapture in your mind possible intertexts, that is, other 
poetic pronouncements on Fate, uninvited guests, the banquet of 
life, etc. 
But when one tries to separate the properties of the object itself 
from the manner of its decoding and interpretation one finds that 
there are no clear guidelines. It may well be that all observed 
structures are in fact properties of the interaction between the object 
observed and the observer in a specific cultural situation. The 
structures of our love sonnet may well not 'exist' in any ontological 
sense; or, if one must use this word, they exist in a culturally 
conditioned, though not wholly determined, system of interpretation, 
to which individual readings must refer. This system would then 
be not so much a social institution totally outside the individual, 
like the Saussurean langue, but a grammar of interpretive rules 
internalised by the literature consumer, more like the Chomskyan 
competence. 
That accounts for the shift, in recent times, from a text-based to 
a reader-centred literary criticism, in other words, from the study 
of certain objects to the study of the theoretical models by which 
we attempt to understand them. This shift was in a sense paralleled 
both by the new scientific epistemologies championed by Popper, 
Kuhn, Lakatos (to mention but a few names), showing that science 
was very much unlike the objective experimental model favoured 
during the age of Positivism; and by the second linguistic revolution 
headed by Chomsky in the 'sixties, which attempted not so much to 
construct a grammar generating all the acceptable sentences of a 
natural language, as to clarify many of the issues relating to the 
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evaluation of alternative theoretical models of language. The 
question was no longer: 'How does language work?' but 'How do 
we understand our language competence?' Similarly the question 
that literary critics began to ask was no longer: 'What do texts 
mean?' but 'How do readers construct meanings?' The theories of 
production of literary texts have been supplanted by theories of 
their reception; the analysis of how they came to be constructed by 
elaborate deconstructions. Let me now move towards my conclusion 
by sketching some of the difficulties arising from the new critical 
approaches. 
We may readily agree with Jonathan Culler that, since there is 
no rigorous way to distinguish fact from interpretation, nothing 
can be deemed to be definitively in the text prior to interpretive 
conventions. The fact remains nevertheless that someone produced 
the text, and did so in the full knowledge of the prevailing or 
possible interpretive conventions. Granted that the literary text is 
unlike most objects of scientific investigation, like a crystal or a 
gene, it is so because unlike crystals and genes it is the outcome of 
an intention to mean something. That should not be taken as if all 
the meanings the text carries were deliberately planted there by its 
author, for many are not; nor as if the reader's task were to 
reconstruct the author's intentions; but in the general sense that the 
author has a conscious project to produce meaning. The author's 
intention to mean has as its necessary counterpart the reader's 
assumption that the text is meaningful. Meaning is therefore 
teleological, whereas what a scientist can discover about crystals or 
genes is teleonomical, according to the distinction made by Jacques 
Monod. Nature's overall tendency is that crystals and genes should 
produce copies of themselves, but this tendency is built in the 
system; and, even if one believes in a Divine plan, it is not necessary 
to suppose that God personally supervises every crystalline accretion 
or genetic replication, as opposed to having created a system where 
these things occur by themselves. But texts do not happen by 
themselves. Furthermore they do not replicate themselves. Whereas 
the natural universe exhibits stability and invariance as its most 
startling characteristic, and mutations as exceptions to the rule, 
literature, and art in general, is infinitely variable and unrepeatable, 
and the stable point of reference offered by tradition is only the 
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springboard for endless mutations. 
The impossibility of sequential comprehension of a text applies 
to its writer before it applies to anyone else. I spent several days 
preparing this lecture, admittedly not an artistic text, and in the 
process I have read each of its paragraphs, in sequence and out of 
sequence, at least fifty times. So must anyone writing a poem or a 
novel. Writers are the first consumers of their texts. An interesting 
metaphor of this fact, widespread in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, was that writers often disguised themselves as mere editors 
of aCcidentally found manuscripts. 1hey presented themselves as 
readers, before pretending to be re-writers. But can the fact that 
authors are the first consumers of the text they destine for their 
public bridge the unavoidable gap that separates authors and readers? 
Authors may have some understanding of their contemporary 
readers' literary competence but may not always be able to foresee 
future trends or cultural changes even when they include future 
readers in their virtual audience. And we may be unable to share 
today the same viewpoint as the author's original readers. 
We have already touched on various ways of bridging the gap, 
all implying the gathering of philological, historical, literary, 
philosophical, ideological, biographical evidence to bear on our 
understanding of the text. The problem is that there are no theoretical 
limits to the extension of the cultural context, or to the number of 
intertexts that may be relevant to a text. It would not be safe to 
presume that the relevant ones are only those preceding the text, 
since some later writers may show in their work illuminating 
references to it which it would be perilous to neglect. Tradition 
extends both ways. There are furthermore no sure and objective 
criteria to define what is relevant. The field of investigation thus 
becomes practically infinite. If we now move, out of desperation, 
from what mediates between the author and the reader to the structure 
of the reader's competence and the study of the theoretical models 
whereby the reader understands the text, we fall into an infinite 
regress, because the reader's understanding of the text presupposes 
certain theoretical models, our understanding of those theoretical 
models needs an epistemological theory, the epistemological theory 
requires a decision procedure to choose between epistemological 
theories, the decision procedure has to be set up according to valid 
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criteria, the determination of those criteria ... and we could go on. 
Between any reader and a text we can easily interpose: a reading of 
the text, an analysis of the reading of the text, a criticism of various 
types of analysis, a history of the various criticisms levelled at 
possible types of analysis, a general theory of text analysis, a 
survey of the theories of text analysis suggesting that textual analysis 
is impossible, and so on and so forth. It is easy to forget that 
reading comes before any analysis of the reading. Perhaps the fact 
that reading, a seemingly simple operation, is so inherently complex, 
as I have tried to describe, induces us to confuse it with a complex 
critical procedure. But to read is not to criticise. I do not embark 
upon the criticism of the love sonnet we started from because I 
want to find out whether I enjoy it or not. I already know that. The 
end of the author's meaning-generating project is reading and 
enjoyment, not criticism. Criticism only helps me to understand 
how and why I enjoy what I enjoy, and it may improve my enjoyment 
only as a consequence of my improved understanding of myself 
and the mental processes of another reader (the critic). Criticism 
throws more light on the critic than on the author who is its object. 
Two final transplants, both related to the idea I foreshadowed 
that it may be impossible to arrive at a global understanding, or a 
perfectly coherent description of the meaning of anything. The first 
one comes from the uncertainty prinCiple discovered by the physicist 
Werner Heisenberg in 1927 according to which measuring one 
quantity renders impossible the simultaneous measurement of a 
related quantity because our observation interferes with either one 
or the other measurement. This prinCiple was readily adapted by 
social scientists who began to understand how the outcome of any 
observation is vitiated by the fact that the observer interferes with 
what is being observed. It has been suggested that the impossibility 
of finding out both the mass and a velocity of a subatomic particle 
by hitting it with another particle, which is the only way we can 
conduct the investigation, is in some ways similar to an anomaly 
found by Kurt GOdeI in the construction of theories of mathematics 
by means of mathematical reasoning carried out by Russell, 
Whitehead and Hilbert. In 1931 Godel stated his famous theorem, 
that it is impossibie to prove the consistency of a formal system 
within the system itself, and that all consistent axiomatic 
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formulations of a self-referential system include undecidable 
propositions. Transplants must be performed very cautiously, 
because of the very serious chance of rejection. But if we were to 
extend Godel's theorem to language, it would seem to suggest that 
any use of metalanguage to investigate language, however rigorous, 
leads to paradoxes; which is perhaps what Sapir sensed when he 
said that 'all grammars leak' . 
The most famous of these paradoxes is the Epimenides paradox. 
Epimenides was a Cretan who said 'All Cretans are liars'. If you 
take Epimenides's quotation as language, then what I say about 
him and his statement lies within a first-level metalanguage. If 
Epimenides is a Cretan and all Cretans are liars, then his statement 
that all Cretans are liars must be a lie, hence Cretans are not liars. 
But if we thus accept that Epimenides, as a Cretan, is not a liar, 
then his statement that Cretans are liars must be the truth, hence he 
must be a liar. Russell tried to solve this and other similar paradoxes 
by means of the theory of types. Applying it to language, it says 
that any statement in a language is not referred to by any statement 
in a higher order metalanguage. Thus what we say in our 
metalanguage about Epimenides and his use of language has no 
bearing on his use of language. It is easy to show that this modified 
theory of types creates more problems than it solves, because it 
allows the possibility of setting up an infinite regression of 
metalanguages, and does away with what we have assumed to be 
the fundamental property of language which is self-reference. A 
final passing thought is that, if Heisenberg and Godel are right, 
then it may be impossible for human brains to produce a consistent 
theory of the workings of human brains, which is what language, 
mathematics, the arts and criticism are all about. 
This conclusion is far from being depressing. To begin with 
nobody needs an absolute, perfectly consistent formal theory of 
anything. After all mathematicians, according to GOdel, can get on 
perfectly well without one. Physicists continue to probe successfully 
the mysteries of the universe in spite of Heisenberg's uncertainty 
principle, or perhaps because of it. Only literary theorists fail to 
realise that they cannot at the same time demonstrate anybody 
else's inability to produce a consistent theory of literature, and 
present their own work as being the ultimate and absolute theory of 
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literature, covering essential aspects the others have neglected or 
ignored. Given what they themselves have revealed and emphasised, 
the practically infinite complexity of the textual and intertextual 
system, added to the complex infinity of our human culture in its 
historical development over time and space, and to any as yet 
unrevealed complexities that future generations of critics may reveal, 
it may be totally unreasonable to aim for total understanding. A 
more reasonable task may be for critics to define as clearly as 
possible the margins of applicability of any methodology they may 
wish to use to ~he limited purpose for which they wish to use it, in 
the full knowledge that wider margins or different purposes may 
require a different methodology. Different answers to critical 
questions are not necessarily contradictory or incompatible, and it 
is only because of the dictates of the PhD industry and the career 
needs of academics that they are often alleged to be so. 
A second positive conclusion is that we must do away with 
what I would call the 'humanistic cringe', the absurd idea that the 
humanities are inherently incapable of the same order of achievement 
in the elaboration or acquisition of knowledge as the so-called 
exact sciences; when it has been increasingly apparent for the past 
half century or longer that the sciences are not as exact as people 
used to believe. The reason why all chemists agree on the formula 
of hexachlorophene, while most critics will disagree in their 
conclusions about a love sonnet, is not that chemistry has better 
decision procedures than literary criticism, simply that literary critics 
do not need to have the same area of agreement as chemists because, 
as we suggested earlier on, natural objects are teleonomically 
invariant, whereas artistic objects are teleologically mutant and 
therefore posit a totally different type of scientific investigation. 
The final positive conclusion is that both the arts and the sciences 
benefit from mutual contact and understanding: and that is where 
interdisciplinarity comes in. We have suffered far too much from a 
particularised, compartmentalised approach, all too often resulting 
from the pertinacity with which academics defend their perceived 
territory; the deep-seated tendency of educational administrators 
to see educationally sound developments not as the aim of their 
professional career but as the means to advance it; the inability 
of politicians and those whom they persuade to toe their line to 
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understand that we already have a clever country: the country of 
Alan Bond, Brian Burke, Laurie Connell, Brian Youill, Christopher 
Skase and John Spalvins, to name but a few who were mentioned 
until recently as shining examples of true Aussie cleverness. What 
we need is an intelligent country, where education does not corne 
second best to employment and is not confused with training, but 
enjoys the true breadth, depth and creativity that comes from the 
wider horizons of interdisciplinarity; where a society whose horizons 
have been perversely restricted to one single valueless dimension, 
the economy of disposable incomes, can rediscover the dimension 
of human values which the humanities, the arts, and especially 
literature can provide. 
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